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This article argues that recent developments in UK counterinsurgency strategy and
subsequent counterterror legislation have been informed and enabled by military and
political interventions in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland. The article contains three
interconnecting arguments. First, that UK counterterrorism policies since the interven-
tion in Afghanistan are an extension of previous practices in Northern Ireland during
the 1970s and 1980s, rather than representing a new phase in security strategy. Second,
that the articulation of the external terror threat by successive UK governments since
9/11 has led to a blurring of emergency law into domestic governance and a movement
of this emergency legislation from the colonial periphery into the metropolitan centre.
Third, the article argues that the techniques at the heart of these counterinsurgency
efforts risk hollowing out the values they are supposed to uphold and defend.
Keywords: counterinsurgency; Northern Ireland; surveillance; torture; terrorism
Introduction
Counterinsurgency is fashionable again: more has been written on it in the last four years than
in the last four decades . . . This is heartening for those who were in the wilderness during
the years when Western governments regarded counterinsurgency as a distraction, of interest
only to historians. So it is no surprise that some have triumphantly urged the re-discovery of
classical, “proven” counterinsurgency methods. (Killcullen 2006a, 111)
Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing
at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, coun-
terinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs
intact. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered
and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. (US Army
2006, 23)
Few themes within academic and policy circles during the twenty-first century have
expanded quite like the interest in insurgency (sometimes also bracketed as terrorism)
(English 2009, 12) and the multifaceted response of security agencies which is frequently
referred to as counterinsurgency, or more recently as counterterrorism. While these def-
initions are not identical, conceptual crossover between the two terms is commonplace,
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especially at the policy level. Byman concedes that the boundaries between the two are
frequently overlapping and difficult to distinguish: “The relationship between counterter-
rorism and counterinsurgency is not new. Many of the state-supported terrorist groups are
also insurgencies – there is no clear dividing line, and in fact tremendous overlap exists”
(Byman 2006, 84).
This article argues that UK counterinsurgency/terrorism policies that have come into
sharp focus since the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 are an exten-
sion of past practice, not a new departure in strategic security. Furthermore, it contends
that what we are seeing today is the importation of a pre-existing strategy from the
colonial periphery into the metropolitan centre. The article demonstrates how the expe-
rience of counterinsurgency from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan has impacted upon
contemporary British security policies since 9/11, leading to a slippage of emergency law
into domestic UK governance. The article makes these arguments by connecting recent
counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and associated UK counterterrorism policies,
with the “classic” counterinsurgency techniques practised in more traditional insurgencies,
specifically, in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s (Clutterbuck 1967; Thompson
1967; Kitson 1971).
It is suggested that the aftermath of 9/11 did not lead to a new security environ-
ment, as many scholars have suggested, nor did the war on terror lead to a paradigmatic
re-calibration of the rights of citizens. Instead, what it has done is to swing the search-
light in new directions and point it more immediately at groups within the metropolitan
centre. While other marginalised minorities in Britain, notably the Islamic commu-
nity, have been subjected to profiling, arrest, detention and suspicion by the security
agencies, a wider political and legal net has been thrown over British society, more
generally, through increased surveillance, the potential of detention and questioning with-
out charge for 28 days (14 days from 2011), and the elastic boundaries of a new
emergency legislation. Consequently, those previously immune from the cutting edges
of counterinsurgency policies now find themselves sharing a burden previously shoul-
dered by communities on the colonial periphery. Thus, counterinsurgency has been
democratised in Britain, as the techniques and strategies of intelligence gathering, surveil-
lance, detention and arrest that were practised in Northern Ireland during the 1970s
have more recently been applied to other target groups. Perhaps more alarmingly, the
state of sustained emergency that exists in Britain today has resulted in a blurring of
the edges between the fight against politically motivated violence and ordinary civil
crime.
The article concludes that the permissive use of counterinsurgency techniques have
become ingrained as aspects of normal or “good governance” (Weiss 2000, 795) within
the United Kingdom in a way that risks hollowing out the very values they claim to protect
and defend.
The emergence of insurgence
Following 9/11, an epoch-shifting period in violent conflict and the security responses to
it was identified by both academic scholars and policymakers. With Al Qaeda’s arrival
into the foreground of international terrorism, the focus of attention shifted from inter-
state wars and ethno-national conflicts to transnational, post-territorial networks (Gleditsch
2007). In the United States, security concerns shifted from the threat posed by domestic
militias and anti-state activists to external networks. In Britain, the focus moved in the

































Critical Studies on Terrorism 3
that 9/11 was the fulcrum point around which perceptions of international security now
turned, heralding a new paradigm of “post-national war”:
According to the judgment of the USA, in the world before 9/11 it was enough to do what
France, Germany, Russia, China, etc. demanded, namely to disarm Saddam Hussein step by
step. In the world after 9/11, on the other hand, such an approach is regarded as foolish and
irresponsible, because even a 1% chance that ‘evil’ dictators such as Saddam Hussein (or
failed states) might supply suicide bombers with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons is
unacceptable and necessitates military action. In such a perspective, we are threatened by a
non-state, socially atomized atomic age in which the existence of humanity is put at risk by
determined suicide bombers capable of almost anything. (Beck 2005, 20)
Aided and abetted by the fascination with the potential of globalisation and its impacts
on technology and communication, the security focus moved to the idea that violent
insurgencies had gone global and that the counterinsurgency response must develop new
multiagency, mobile and fluid strategies to cope with these new violent networks. What was
so different within this context was that the nature of warfare was thought to have changed
radically, requiring responses to it to shift accordingly. With the increase of intra-state
wars and emergence of “new wars” (Kaldor 1999) and “complex political emergencies”
(Goodhand and Hume 1999) during the 1990s, the new millennium gave us new acronyms,
such as “network-centric warfare” (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000) and the “revolution
in military affairs” (Gray 2004) to define the conflict security nexus.
Even academic funding agencies such as the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) identified “new security challenges” as one of their key thematic priorities during
this period, while conceptions of security held by some scholars and policymakers were
encouraged to adapt to this unpredictable new environment:
We are in the midst of a radical dissolution of the markers of certainty that gave us all our
old bearings in relation to war. Traditional forms of conquest, as well as traditional measures
of national capability, land or raw materials, for example, recede dramatically in significance
under the dynamics of network-centric warfare. (Dillon 2002, 74)
Defence analysts, for their part, devised their own new terms for this new environment,
such as fourth-generation warfare (4GW), conceptualised as the synthesis of traditional
insurgency, transnationalism and globalisation:
Fourth-generation warfare, which is now playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a modern
form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strate-
gic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental
precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic
and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this
type of warfare is difficult to defeat. Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains focused
on changing the minds of decision makers. Politically, it involves transnational, national, and
subnational organizations and networks. (Hammes 2005, 1)
Advocates of this 4GW re-branding saw the way forward in terms of integrated and coordi-
nated military and political initiatives. These differed little from the traditional asymmetric
warfare and existing counterinsurgency orthodoxy, with a renewed emphasis on networked
intelligence and “joined-up” action. As one of 4GW’s key architects puts it:
In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state mili-


































the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing. Fourth Generation war is also marked by a
return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the
Christian West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the
strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam
has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. (Lind 2004)
Critics of 4GW see it as a dangerous theoretical distraction, based on flawed readings
of history on the one hand, and “guesstimates” regarding future trends in warfare on the
other: “In its earliest stages, 4GW amounted to an accumulation of speculative rhapsodies
that blended a manoeuvre-theorist’s misunderstanding of the nature of terrorism with a
futurist’s infatuation with ‘high technology’” (Echevarria II 2005, 2).
As the gap narrowed between military and civilian actors in war, the timeframes
and physical spaces within which conflict took place, and even the weapons used to
fight, a paradigm shift was seen to have occurred in how to win them. The focus with
counterinsurgency operations saw a re-calibration from conventional post-Vietnam US
thinking on outright military victory, “shock and awe”, to a renewed emphasis on the polit-
ical. The logic of counterinsurgency strategy was not to kill the enemy (or rather, not just to
kill them), but also to co-opt them into a longer term political project which enshrined the
wider war aims and political values of counterinsurgency actors. For much of the period
since 11 September 2001, these ideas have dominated scholarly debates on security and
were held to represent a new phase in contemporary understandings of war and the inter-
national response to insurgency and international terrorism (Hoffman 2002; Beck 2005;
Byman 2006).
In short, such violence was different in the twenty-first century. It was post-territorial,
interconnected, organic and global, requiring new strategies, new thinking and new struc-
tures in order to deal with it effectively. Hoffman makes the point starkly in the context of
the 9/11 attacks: “On 11 September, Bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional
wisdom on terrorists and terrorism and, by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict”
(Hoffman 2002, 306).
Bringing it all back home
Previously the primary domain of defence analysts and other security strategists, the debate
surrounding counterinsurgency has today expanded to include a much more diverse range
of scholarship. Indeed, this renewed interest in counterinsurgency strategy has captured the
academic imagination on both conceptual and empirical levels and has crossed scholarly
disciplines from history and war studies, to political science and international relations,
peace studies, sociology, human geography and human rights law.
Given the impact of the war on terror on international politics, global economics and
popular culture, it is hardly surprising that academic debate has been dominated by it.
As Sitaraman has remarked,
Counterinsurgency is the warfare of the age . . . Today, it has become common, even trite, to
announce that the nature of warfare is changing. Insurgents do not look like the soldiers and
warriors of the past. They are not amassed in great armies; they do not confront their enemy
on the battlefield; they may not even be affiliated with a state. (Sitaraman 2009, 1)
Daniel Byman, a vigorous cheerleader of US counterinsurgency efforts in the war on terror,

































Critical Studies on Terrorism 5
violence towards wider strategic goals: “Defeating an insurgent movement is as much (if
not more) a political effort as a military one” (Byman 2006, 95).
It is argued here that neither counterinsurgency/terrorism techniques nor the wider
security and justice system within which it is located has actually changed as much as
some have claimed. Contemporary advocates of counterinsurgency, for instance, argue that
the modern era has witnessed a fundamental shift in the nature of contemporary guerrilla
warfare that requires a radical reordering of the security response: “In fact, today’s insur-
gencies differ significantly – at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical
technique – from those of earlier eras . . . much is new in counterinsurgency redux, pos-
sibly requiring fundamental re-appraisals of conventional wisdom” (Killcullen 2006a, 1).
However, Killcullen overstates the changes that have taken place, both in terms of the
nature of guerrilla warfare and Western military and political responses to it.
From a radically different angle, the renewed post-structuralist focus within interna-
tional relations scholarship after 9/11 on “governmentality”, and more recently “liberal
cosmopolitanism” (Jabri 2011), misreads a new and powerful searchlight in the way of war
for the direction of its beam. The contention within much of this scholarship has been that
the post-9//11 security response represented a step change in the treatment of indigenous
citizens, minority groups and foreign nationals by states and their coercive agencies. The
incarceration of people without charge in Guantánamo Bay, extra-judicial assassinations,
the physical torture and psychological humiliation of prisoners held in custody through
extraordinary rendition, waterboarding and other forms of abuse, was considered by many
to be a new departure and the creation of new forms of explicit and implicit control (Jabri
2006, 51).
All of these post-9/11 reforms and practices, of course, presented significant civil lib-
erties challenges and abuses. However, they did not represent a change in the rules of
governance so much as they reflected an application of existing emergency norms to new
constituencies previously immune from the security and counterinsurgency nexus. What is
different today is that the people affected by UK counterinsurgency strategies have altered,
and what used to be confined to the outer edges of Empire in Kenya, Malaya, Aden and
Ireland has been brought home by the war on terror to the metropolitan centres of Western
society, in Britain and beyond.1
Back to the future: notes from a small province
This section of the article outlines the main planks of British counterinsurgency policies
in Northern Ireland from 1969–1998. It first examines the attempts to manage paramili-
tary violence through techniques such as internment and via the extension of emergency
law. It then goes on to assess how the drive for enhanced intelligence produced increased
levels of maltreatment by the police and army of many of those they detained and interro-
gated. Finally, it explains how the desire to win the propaganda war led to policies such as
Ulsterisation and criminalisation, in an effort to cast the paramilitaries (rather than British
security forces) as the main causal factors in the conflict.
It is recognised that there are significant differences of scale and intensity of violence
between Afghanistan and Northern Ireland, the former being a war and the latter a low-
intensity ethno-national conflict. However, the important point is not so much whether
this is a closely matched pair but rather the way in which the effort to win “the battle for
hearts and minds” in both was beset by similar problems. In both cases, the four pillars of
traditional counterinsurgency strategy were apparent: first, the demonstration of sufficient


































to be a non-malign actor in the eyes of the local civilian population; third, the importance
of local police primacy as a replacement for external military intervention; and fourth, the
importance of connecting the explicit military function within an implicit political strategy
as a means of coordinating longer term aims and objectives (Dixon 2009, 446).
The purpose here is not to pick at the barely healed scabs of that violent conflict, nor
to cast the counter as being worse than the insurgency. The intention is rather to highlight
the similarities with contemporary counterinsurgency techniques practised in Afghanistan
and the impact of such policies on domestic norms of governance within Britain itself, and
UK counterterrorism legislation in particular.
British counterinsurgency policies in Northern Ireland grew incrementally out of con-
fusion and the lack of understanding on the one hand about what was going on in Northern
Ireland in the early 1970s, together with an overriding urge on the other hand not to get
involved politically in the region. Initially, this took the form of intervening militarily by
sending troops to Belfast and Derry to contain sectarian strife in August 1969, but not
getting directly involved politically. Desperate to avoid becoming embroiled in a conflict
it did not understand and did not see as a political priority, the British government ceded
operational control of the British army to an increasingly weak and desperate unionist
government, and allowed it to determine security policies, including the declaration of mil-
itary curfews in Belfast, the use of rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse demonstrations
and the introduction of internment without trial in 1971. It was only when these initia-
tives failed (spectacularly in the case of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972, when the
British Parachute Regiment killed 14 unarmed civilians in Derry during a peaceful civil
rights march) that the British government took back political responsibility for its own
military strategy in Northern Ireland. By this point, the paramilitary factions had become
well established and troops that had been welcomed initially as peacekeepers were now
regarded by most Catholic nationalists as a hostile army, enforcing Protestant unionist
political objectives.
Counterinsurgency techniques such as internment were counterproductive in military
terms because it was mostly innocent people who were arrested, it was overwhelmingly
targeted at the Catholic nationalist community and the levels of violence subsequently
escalated dramatically (Tonge 2002, 44). In political terms, internment cast the army as an
aggressive malevolent force and presented Northern Ireland as being in a state of emer-
gency, a narrative which suited the Provisional IRA rather than the British government.
The conclusions of the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) on the negative
impact of internment do not overstate the case:
Like so many similar initiatives, it was intended to be a short-term solution to a short-term
problem. It proved, even in the opinion of its creators, to be a major setback. Everyone agrees
that internment failed because of poor intelligence and the wide-scale detention (for long
periods) of innocent people. This wrong was further compounded when some internees were
subjected to ill-treatment, amounting, in the view of the European Commission of Human
Rights, to torture. The allegations of torture and ill-treatment, further fuelled anger in the
communities from which the internees were drawn, and reduced the potential for important
information-gathering. (CAJ 2008, 12)
Aside from efforts to restrict paramilitary activities to “an acceptable level of violence”,2
the key security objective during this period was to criminalise the paramilitaries. In order
to do this, the police/army had to de-legitimise the paramilitary factions and cast them as
murdering thugs, rather than “volunteers”3 who were using violence against imperial occu-

































Critical Studies on Terrorism 7
overcome) civil unrest and paramilitary violence, the political objective was to isolate the
paramilitaries from the wider communities whose active and passive support was required
for the continuation of their violent campaigns.
All sides became involved in an arms race at both military and political levels.
Surveillance and British infiltration into the paramilitary organisations led to organisa-
tional re-structuring of these groups into small cellular “active service units” in the early
1970s, while security policies designed to detain and disarm republican paramilitaries led
to increased recruits into the Provisional IRA, due to the perceived brutality of the police
and British army. During this military and political up-scaling between the British secu-
rity forces and the Provisional IRA, intelligence became paramount and counterinsurgency
strategy quickly rotated around the use of emergency law, surveillance operations and
detention without trial. Perhaps most controversially, the drive for better intelligence, allied
with the permissive legal apparatus, led to a lengthy detention of suspects, coercive and
abusive questioning, and a perilous lack of accountability or political oversight of the secu-
rity agencies – what might be termed “ordinary rendition”, enabled through emergency
legal norms and operationalised by the security forces. While these themes have arisen in
Britain since 2001, they were a staple ingredient of British counterinsurgency strategy in
Northern Ireland (and thus within the United Kingdom) during the 1970s and 1980s.
The legal apparatus was the bedrock for security policies in Northern Ireland during
this period. The Special Powers Act which came into force in 1922 shortly after the creation
of Northern Ireland, and its successor the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) in 1973, pro-
vided the legal basis for many of the counterinsurgency activities of the 1970s and 1980s.
The Special Powers Act provided wide-ranging and draconian powers to the police and
other security agencies, including the right to arrest people without a warrant, intern peo-
ple without trial, issue curfews and prohibit inquests into allegations of illegal killings by
the police (O’Leary and McGarry 1993, 127). These emergency powers were made per-
manent in 1933, until the EPA in 1973 supplemented this legislation with the introduction
of Diplock courts (trial without jury) for a range of scheduled offences. This notion of
“scheduling” packaged certain offences with mandatory prison sentences, such as mem-
bership of a proscribed organisation or possession of firearms, required a low burden of
proof (e.g., uncorroborated forced confessions obtained from prisoners in custody) and
were processed through the courts by individual judges in non-jury trials. This led to fast
and efficient prosecutions but also allegations of injustice and maltreatment.
Confession evidence and witness statements (it was not a requirement that the witness actu-
ally appear in court) were accorded an extremely high level of admissibility within the court
proceedings. For the purpose of obtaining such evidence, special interrogation centres were to
be established at Castlereagh in Belfast and Gough Barracks in Armagh. Both centres were
operational by 1977. The establishment of these centres led to a phenomenal increase in the
number of complaints made against the RUC in respect of ill treatment during interrogation.
. . . The venerated principles of British justice became, in the context of Northern Ireland,
just another strategy to deal with political violence. Any technique of repression could, if it
were seen to have a legal foundation, be portrayed as legitimate and conducted within the law.
(Ellison and Smyth 2000, 80)
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was introduced in Great Britain in 1974 following
the Birmingham pub bombings which killed 21 people and was similar in nature to the
EPA in Northern Ireland. Both the EPA and the PTA were defined as being unfortunate but


































though in practice they became permanent fixtures in the United Kingdom’s legal portfo-
lio as a means of pursuing its counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland. Ni Aolain
has highlighted the fact that when the emergency becomes the norm, the criminal justice
system inevitably becomes politicised as a consequence:
ordinary law has been bent out of shape and beyond all recognition in Northern Ireland. Its
surgical remoulding has been both responsive to the conflict and defining of it. This tells us
that legality is not a neutral actor in a situation of conflict. Law defines and takes sides and it
has done so in Northern Ireland. (Ni Aolain 2000, 14)
Advocates and architects of classic counterinsurgency techniques, such as General Sir
Frank Kitson, have stated that the law is an important component of such a strategy. Kitson
was a counterinsurgency practitioner in Kenya and Malaya, became head of the army in
Northern Ireland and wrote a classic text on the subject in 1971, where he stated that:
“The law should be used as just another weapon in the government’s arsenal . . . For
this to happen efficiently, the activities of the legal services have to be tied to the war
effort in as discreet a way as possible” (Kitson, in Ellison and Smyth 2000, 74). While the
legal framework served to provide a cloak of normality to the counterinsurgency strategy,
the operational security techniques which were enabled by this legislation were extremely
robust and served to further alienate the nationalist community from the rule of law and
thus perpetuate the existence of paramilitary violence.
Loyalist attitudes towards the criminal justice system were less badly affected. One
reason for this was because they generally started with a more positive attitude towards
the British justice system (and the British army specifically). Also, at a practical level,
loyalist communities experienced a much lighter touch than their republican counterparts.
Loyalist violence was less central to British counterinsurgency strategy for two general
reasons. First, it was seen from the British perspective as being reactive to the militant
separatist intent of the Provisional IRA. In other words, there was no insurgent political
project that needed to be thwarted by the State. The second reason why loyalist violence
remained largely exempt from British counterinsurgency efforts was largely pragmatic.
The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were a less pressing
security priority for British politicians (and therefore the security services) because they
were not conducting a bombing campaign within Great Britain. Thus, while loyalists were
technically subject to the same legal treatment as republicans (e.g., arrest, detention, inter-
rogation, non-jury trials, etc.), the application of policies such as internment, riot-control
policing, curfews, army patrols/house raids was experienced much more frequently within
republican areas (Bruce 1994; Ellison and Smyth 2000; Ni Aolain 2000).
Ordinary renditions
The concept of extraordinary rendition became a notorious aspect of American efforts
to improve intelligence following the 9/11 attacks. This has also been referred to as the
outsourcing of torture, whereby the US government with the tacit approval of its allies
(including the Irish, British and other European governments) forcibly apprehended sus-
pects abroad, kidnapped and flew them to countries such as Yemen, Jordan, Morroco and
Uzbekistan for coercive interrogation.4 While the exposure of this policy during the war on
terror led to denials of anything unlawful by those involved, this was not a new departure
in US policy, as the practice had been used by the Reagan Presidency against its opponents
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In truth, coercive questioning up to and including torture has been a feature of
counterinsurgency policies since long before the war on terror commenced, and in some
cases it has not been necessary to transport suspects out of the country in order to
participate in this particular form of intelligence gathering:
. . . a hood was pulled over my head and I was handcuffed and subjected to verbal and personal
abuse, which included the threat of being dropped from a helicopter which was in the air, being
kicked and struck about the body with batons on the way . . . After this all my clothes were
taken from me and I was given a boiler suit to wear which had no buttons and which was
several sizes too big for me. During all this time the hood was still over my head and the
handcuffs were removed only at the time of the “medical examination”. I was then taken into
what I can only guess was another room and was made to stand with my feet wide apart and
my hands pressed against a wall. During all this time I could hear a low droning noise, which
sounded to me like an electric saw or something of that nature. This continued for what I can
only describe as an indefinite period of time . . . My brain seemed ready to burst. What was
going to happen to me? Was I alone? Are they coming to kill me? I wished to God they would,
to end it. (McGuffin 1974, 65)
The above quote does not refer to the treatment of an inmate at Abu Ghraib jail or
Guantánamo Bay detention centre, but to a suspect held without charge in Magilligan army
base in Belfast in 1972. Paddy Joe MacLean, a school teacher from Co. Tyrone (who subse-
quently turned out to have no paramilitary connections) was one of a group of 14 detainees
since referred to as the “guineapigs”, who were subjected to the “five techniques” (Dixon
2009, 458) of sensory deprivation during coercive questioning. These techniques involved
a typical pattern of physical and mental ill-treatment combined with attempts to confuse
and disorientate suspects to make them more suggestible, through hooding, sleep and food
deprivation, repetitive questioning, subjugation to white noise and a range of more petty
harassments over a period of days. Such questioning was carried out by the British army’s
Force Research Unit and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch at a number of
army centres, chiefly Palace Barracks and Girdwood Barracks, together with Magilligan
and Ballykilner army camps. Following their public exposure, the five techniques, which
had been imported by the British army, via the KGB as a staple of its counterinsurgency
operations in Kenya, Cyprus and Aden, were quickly disowned by the British government
(Taylor 1980, 26). The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg judged that sub-
stantial ill-treatment of prisoners had taken place at Palace Barracks during this period:
“Quite a large number of those held in custody at Palace Barracks were subjected to vio-
lence by members of the RUC. It also led to intense suffering and to physical injury which
on occasions was substantial . . . Those in command at Palace Barracks at the relevant time
could not have been ignorant of the acts involved” (Taylor 1980, 25–26).
As Dickson notes, while the legal semantics revolved around whether to call this activ-
ity torture or not, the political impact was less ambiguous for the British government and
its counterinsurgency effort:
Allegations of physical mistreatment persisted even though the European Commission of
Human Rights had ruled in 1976 that the security forces were torturing suspects in Palace
Barracks, Holywood, a finding reduced by the European Court of Human Rights in 1978 to
one of ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’, still a very embarrassing conclusion for the British
government. (Dickson 2009, 487)
Following the international embarrassment caused by the publicity surrounding the use of


































government in June 1972. However, despite a raft of new directives that followed, issued by
the army and the RUC, maltreatment of suspects continued in more subtle forms, despite
official rhetorical commitments to the humane treatment of prisoners (Ní Aoláin 2000, 55;
Ellison and Smyth 2000, 80).
The point here is not to reify the problematic use of sensory deprivation, as this was
tried for a very short period of time and replaced with more widespread, systemic and sus-
tained forms of coercion by RUC Special Branch. Nor is the argument claiming that the
process of prisoner maltreatment was tantamount to “torture”, as this old legal chestnut
has been well chewed over during the last thirty years in Northern Ireland. Rather, the con-
tention here is that the counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland can be said to have
included (at times) similar techniques to those used to fight contemporary insurgencies in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The twin-track effort to generate accurate intelligence to enable a
swift and mobile military response is combined with various methods to criminalise the
“insurgents” and normalise the conflict zone. Both intelligence gathering and normali-
sation elements of these strategies have witnessed a blurring of normal legal boundaries
where an effort is made to depoliticise violence and define it as being something more than
“ordinary decent crime” but less than a war.
This necessitates stretching a legal canopy across such conflicts without allowing them
to be defined as states of war requiring the treatment of “insurgents” as prisoners of war.
During the House of Commons Debate on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill on 25 November
1974, the Home Secretary of the day, Roy Jenkins, declared that: “These powers are dra-
conian. In combination they are unprecedented in peace time. I believe they are fully
justified to meet the clear and present danger” (Taylor 1980, 36). Almost identical sen-
timents were later uttered by a future Home Secretary during the aftermath of the bus and
underground bomb attacks in London on 7 July 2005, which killed 52 people, as well as the
four bombers. In a statement to the House of Commons, Charles Clarke made the familiar
argument that the new security threat facing the United Kingdom demanded extra legal
powers to combat it:
In recent decades, for all Home Secretaries, the criteria for exercising these powers have gen-
erally been grounds of national security, public order or risk to the UK’s good relations with a
third country. In going beyond these grounds, we rightly need to tread very carefully indeed in
areas that relate to free speech. However, in the circumstances that we now face, I have decided
that it is right to broaden the use of these powers to deal with those who foment terrorism, or
seek to provoke others to commit terrorist acts. To that end, I intend to draw up a list of unac-
ceptable behaviours that fall within those powers – for example, preaching, running websites
or writing articles that are intended to foment or provoke terrorism. (Hansard 2005, c.1255)
However, as Liberty has indicated, there is a danger when emergency legislation is stretched
to the point that it becomes inseparable from the normal civil criminal justice system:
The problem of course is how to define an “emergency”, when does it start and end? The
notion of “emergency” is inherently linked to the concept of “normalcy”, as for something to
be considered an emergency it must be outside the ordinary course or events: it must only last
a relatively short time and yield no substantial permanent effects. The problem occurs when
emergency powers are used when there is arguably no real emergency or when powers invoked
in an emergency are continued once the emergency has passed. (Liberty 2009, 3–4)
Back in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s, the aggressive policing of
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appointed RUC Chief Constable, Kenneth Newman, issued a new directive on the proce-
dure for processing those suspected of terrorist offences. Directive SB 16/13 made clear
that responsibility for all prisoner interrogations lay ultimately with the Chief Constable
and that a distinction was to be made between suspects to be “interviewed” and those who
were to be “interrogated”. Suspects were to be separated into these two categories upon
arrival, with the former track leading to the preferring of charges and possible prosecution,
while the latter led to coercive questioning in pursuit of intelligence (Taylor 1980, 68).
These interrogations became notorious for allegations of abusive treatment of suspects by
RUC Special Branch and led to investigations by Amnesty International in 1978 and the
British government’s own Bennett Report in 1979.5 While the British government and the
RUC Chief Constable could claim that interrogations took place within the law, the criti-
cal point was that the legal framework, in the shape of the EPA, was sufficiently elastic to
facilitate and enable the physical and mental abuse of suspects while in custody.
Allegations emerged in October 2012 that the British themselves had used waterboard-
ing techniques in Northern Ireland during the 1970s. Liam Holden (then a 19-year-old)
claimed that he was abducted by the Parachute Regiment in 1972 and waterboarded until
he confessed to the murder of a soldier:
They got the bucket of water and they just slowly but surely poured the bucket of water right
round the facial area, over my nose and mouth . . . It was like pouring a kettle of water, like
pouring your tea into a cup out of the kettle, that sort of speed, basically until I passed out or
close to passed out. (Kearney 2012)
He later confessed to the murder and spent 17 years in jail before the conviction was
quashed by the Court of Appeal in 2012.
The contention here is that the legal framework that facilitated counterinsurgency poli-
cies in Northern Ireland during the 1970s has now been rolled out across the rest of the
United Kingdom and expanded to the point that it has become relatively easy to monitor,
arrest, detain and interrogate people within the law, due to the inherent emergency asso-
ciated with the threat of terrorist violence and the blurry edges of the concept of national
security (see below).
The other argument which should provide pause for thought when considering cur-
rent counterinsurgency policies in Afghanistan is that the strategy did not succeed in
Northern Ireland. While some battles were won through surveillance, information gained
from informers and the direct operations of special forces against the Provisional IRA, the
wider political war for “hearts and minds” (Killcullen 2006b, 5) was lost. Such activities
fed rather than starved paramilitary factions of community support and helped to inter-
nationalise the conflict, sucking in wider actors from Libya and elsewhere. As Dickson
concludes:
What is certain is that the security force strategy of winning the hearts and minds of people
living in communities in Northern Ireland within which republican paramilitaries operated did
not work . . . Neither the IRA nor the security forces won the conflict. Those who lost were
the victims of human rights violations on all sides. (Dickson 2009, 491)
The Ulsterisation of Afghanistan
One of the key counterinsurgency policies attempted by British political and security agen-
cies in Northern Ireland during the conflict was “Ulsterisation” (Arthur 2000, 165). This
focused on trying to convey the impression that the region was not under foreign occu-


































would provide a sense of normalisation. More specifically, it was felt that security would
be improved through the advantages of local delivery and that the “homeland” appetite in
Britain for involvement in Northern Ireland would improve due to the reduction in regular
army fatalities.
The political aim of Ulsterisation was to dent the argument of militant republican-
ism that it was in an anti-imperialist war with hostile British forces, continuing centuries
of physical force resistance against the traditional colonial enemy. Reducing the presence
of the British army and strengthening the capacity of the police and local military units,
such as the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), made it easier for the British to frame the
“insurgency” in Northern Ireland as criminal terrorism and cold blooded murder, rather
than a liberation struggle, as the Provisional IRA and its supporters argued. Ulsterisation
was supported by a policy of “Criminalisation” where paramilitary rights to “special cate-
gory status” (McEvoy 2001, 216) in prisons was removed, thereby defining those in jail as
civil criminals rather than politically motivated guerrillas.
Ulsterisation took effect during the mid-1970s though it had been planned from an early
stage of British military intervention in Northern Ireland in August 1969 (Dixon 2001,
116). Its slow deployment was due in part to the lack of credibility of the local security
forces (especially the RUC and the UDR) within the Catholic population and the intense
levels of violence perpetrated by the Provisional IRA during the early 1970s. The success
of Ulsterisation was mixed. It did help to reduce the number of British soldiers being killed
and thus produced some public relations gains for the UK government, but it failed to gain
credibility within the Catholic community or damage support for militant republicanism.
The view from this quarter was that the British had simply handed security control to
the discredited, largely un-reformed and partisan unionist community, in the shape of the
RUC and UDR (Tonge 2006, 66–67). Ulsterisation also led to a sharper violent interface
within Northern Ireland between militant republicans and the Protestant-dominated RUC
and UDR, which had been placed at the cutting edge of the counterinsurgency strategy.
The deaths and injuries that resulted soured relations even further between the moderate
unionist and nationalist political factions, making a consensus-driven political settlement
an even more remote possibility (O’Leary and McGarry 1993, 205)
While Ulsterisation was not an unqualified success, its basic political logic was dusted
off for the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan in 2010. Fittingly, the Ulsterisation
of Afghanistan was announced by the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at a
keynote international conference on the region which took place in London in January
2010:
This is a decisive time for the international operation that is helping the Afghan people
secure and govern their own country. For this conference marks the beginning of the tran-
sition process – agreeing the necessary conditions under which we can begin – district by
district and province by province – the process for transferring responsibility for security
from international forces to Afghan forces . . . I have described our shared strategy as one of
“Afghanisation” – building up Afghan institutions – the army, the police, and the Government
– so that as they become stronger we can hand over to them the responsibility of tackling ter-
rorism and extremism, and our forces can start to come home. It will take time – but I believe
the conditions set out in the plan we will sign up to today can be met sooner than many expect,
and that as a result the process of handover will begin later this year. (Brown 2010)
As the counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland demonstrates, external manipulation
of internal security structures is a hazardous and precarious endeavour, and winning local
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Winning the battle for “hearts and minds” was not achieved with Ulsterisation in
Northern Ireland, because a significant section of the community considered it to be driven
by a desire for security with order instead of security with justice. It was attempted on
the basis of a security apparatus which was not adequately reformed so as to be repre-
sentative of the whole community and accountable to it. As Dickson reflects: “General Sir
Frank Kitson’s hearts and minds strategy cannot be said to have been a success in Northern
Ireland. The conflict was not brought to an end as a result of excellent intelligence being
acquired and the local population being somehow won over” (Dickson 2009, 486).
The lessons from Northern Ireland for UK policy in Afghanistan are obvious. As in the
case of British counterinsurgency efforts in Northern Ireland, alleged failings which fuel
the belief that external military forces are a hostile occupying army are likely to quickly
undo any progress that is made towards winning the battle for hearts and minds and prevent
the co-option of local people into the wider security strategy. One example of this will
suffice, though there are plenty to choose from. On 6 June 2012, 18 Afghan civilians were
killed by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strike in Logar province on the
eastern border with Pakistan. The dead included at least five women and seven children
who had gathered to celebrate a wedding, though Taliban fighters had taken shelter in
the house which was then targeted by NATO forces (Guardian 2012a). The Commander
of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Allen flew to Logar province to
personally apologise for these killings, though he admitted that this could not undo what
had happened: “I know that no apology can bring back the lives of the children or the
people who perished in this tragedy and this accident, but I want you to know that you have
my apology and we will do the right thing by the families” (Guardian 2012a).
Such a reaction illustrates NATO’s awareness that such accidents were likely to damage
their strategic political goals in the region. Given the history of external intervention in
Afghanistan it is difficult to see the battle for hearts and minds being won in Afghanistan
anytime soon. Trust between the NATO forces and the local population is in short supply
and lacks any realistic timeframe (Thruelsen 2007, 14; Suhrke 2008, 214). It certainly looks
extremely unlikely to precede the anticipated drawdown of most of the military forces of
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014.
Sharing the pain
The importation of counterinsurgency techniques into everyday governance can lead to
a permissive drift where the emergency becomes the norm and mutates into acceptable
forms of “good governance” (Weiss 2000, 795), with an inevitable erosion of mainstream
rights and liberties. The United Kingdom’s eager participation in the war on terror, and
specifically its roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, has become fused with concerns about its
own internal security and the threat of politically motivated violence within Britain.
Curiously perhaps, former Prime Minister Tony Blair led a government that was at the
forefront of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (and the pursuit of tighter
legislation to protect perceived national security interests), while at the same time trying
to extricate Britain from some of the excesses of such policies in Northern Ireland. This
is a paradox, though not one frequently problematised by Blair or his government. Blair
appeared blind to the obvious parallel that he had urged peace upon the parties in Northern
Ireland while also preparing for war himself as a partner to the United States-led military
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. His double-standard towards terrorism was pointed
out to him on more than one occasion by unionists who were angry at Blair’s willingness to


































stance with the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Powell 2008, 16). After Blair’s first meeting with
Sinn Fein in 1997, his impromptu walkabout in a Belfast shopping centre was disrupted by
a crowd of unionist protesters who threw rubber gloves at the Prime Minister, the inference
being that he could avoid getting blood on his hands the next time he greeted Adams and
McGuinness (Powell 2008). Blair later admitted the extent of his pragmatism in the context
of the multiparty negotiations in Northern Ireland in 1997–1998 that led to the Good Friday
Agreement, which at times strained the limits of truth and accuracy: “Politicians are obliged
from time to time to conceal the full truth, to bend it and even distort it, where the interests
of the bigger strategic goal demand it be done. Without operating with some subtlety at this
level, the job would be well-nigh impossible” (Blair 2010, 72). However, this admission did
not extend to his recollections over the conduct of foreign policy towards Afghanistan and
Iraq – where moral principle remained at the core of his rationale for war.
For both Tony Blair and his successor Gordon Brown, winning the counterinsurgency
battle in Afghanistan was central to the national security interests of the United Kingdom to
the extent that it bled into the country’s domestic governance. The priority for intelligence
linked to security concerns raised the threat awareness over potential terrorist attacks in
the wake of 9/11. In the cause of preventive action, civil governance within the United
Kingdom became increasingly drawn under the canopy of emergency legislation as public
policy was refracted through the lens of national security. A similar convergence has been
observed within the US context in terms of the application of military doctrine within urban
law enforcement in New York city after 9/11:
Urban security initiatives in New York and other major cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles
have adopted principles from a series of programmes enacted by the US Department of
Defense (DOD) to defend military installations and their surrounding communities against
the mounting threat of political violence, or “terrorism”. (Hidek 2011, 240)
Within the context of governance in the United Kingdom, there has been a convergence
between emergency legal responses to the threat of terrorist attack and ordinary civil law.
By way of an example, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ACTSA) of 2001,
which was rushed through parliament in less than a month following the 9/11 attacks,
contains provisions which potentially relate to non-political terrorist-type offences, such
as the ability to freeze the assets of outside agencies if the UK economy was likely to be
damaged by an external government or individual. This allowed the argument to be made
that the articulation of a terrorist threat was being used in a way that confused emergency
anti-terror legislation with laws aimed at tackling non-terrorist non-political civil crime.
In 2008, the Labour government used such legislation against Iceland, freezing the UK
assets of Icelandic bank Landsbanki and other companies under the powers granted under
the 2001 Act.
This trend of normalising emergency legal measures within UK domestic governance
arguably accelerated with the introduction of the PTA in March 2005. This legislation
introduced a system of control orders allowing for the indefinite house arrest of a person
without trial, though the provisions on control orders were subsequently altered to require
parliamentary approval on a rolling basis on the advice of the Home Secretary, rather than
being a permanent aspect of law. However, like frequent scattered showers, temporary pro-
visions can be permanent in practice if they go on continuously, and this was the experience
with control orders in Britain.
While control orders have proved controversial in the fight against terrorism, they
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Parliament every year and was duly passed on every occasion, control orders persisted
before being replaced in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act
(2011). TPIMs refined rather than removed the policy of limiting an individual’s personal
liberty without the need for legal due process, a fact recognised by Lord Carlile himself,
the government’s former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation:
Although TPIMs are a somewhat diluted version of Control orders, in particular omitting the
valuable requirement of relocation for the most troubling cases, they are in most respects the
same rose by any other name. They retain the vital elements of limitation on activity and
association. (Carlile 2012, 4–5)
Many of these reforms make the legal apparatus used in Northern Ireland during the 1970s
look rather conservative by comparison. By way of example, the original Bill that was to
become the Terrorism Act of 2006, introduced in response to the London bus and under-
ground bombings in July 2005, proposed that the police should be allowed to arrest and
detain people for up to 90 days without charge. While this was eventually reduced to
28 days in the final legislation (which was eventually allowed to expire in January 2011,
reducing the period again to 14 days), this still represents a significant increase on the 7 day
maximum that was allowed in Northern Ireland under the legal canopy used to manage the
conflict during the 1970s and considered by many to be an unfortunate necessity due to
the high level of paramilitary violence that existed at the time. The government tried to
increase the initial 28 day limit to 42 days in the Counter-Terrorism Bill in 2008. However,
in an ironic twist for democracy, while this bill passed through the House of Commons by
a majority of nine votes (and with the crucial support of Northern Ireland’s Democratic
Unionist Party), it was heavily defeated in the Lords and the government effectively con-
ceded defeat on the issue. This also saw Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, David
Davis, resign his parliamentary seat in June 2008 to ostensibly force a by-election over
the issue, claiming that the 42 day limit was “the most salient example of the insidious,
surreptitious and relentless erosion of fundamental British freedoms” (Porter 2008).
The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) passed in 2004, meanwhile, allows the govern-
ment in times of emergency to amend primary legislation over extremely broad aspects
of governance, including the confiscation or destruction of private property, the forcible
movement of people to or from a place, and prohibitions on travel and on peaceful protest
(Liberty 2009, 10). Clearly, one of the critical issues relating to the existence of much of
the anti-terror legislation passed in the United Kingdom since 9/11 relates to the defini-
tion of an “emergency”. Some human rights groups, such as Liberty, have suggested that
the CCA defines the concept of an emergency too widely and in such a manner that pre-
emptive action can be taken on the basis of a perceived threat rather than actual events
having taken place:
“Emergency” in section 19 of the CCA is defined as meaning “an event or situation which
threatens serious damage” to human welfare or the environment or war or terrorism which
threatens serious damage to UK security. However, this means that the event or situation itself
need not be of any seriousness. This means that a relatively innocuous event may be considered
to have implications of damage sufficient to trigger the emergency powers. The decision as to
whether the definition of emergency has been satisfied is effectively made by aMinister. As the
damage needs only be threatened, rather than actual, this may be a highly subjective decision
based on assumptions as to cause and effect. Although parliamentary scrutiny is required, this
is not likely to occur for several days, by which time the regulations may already have had


































the destruction of property – means that their effect is required to be immediate (i.e. before
parliamentary consideration can take place). (Liberty 2009, 10)
Of course, much of this lies in the eye of the beholder and in political interpretations of the
law. The argument here is that the use of the law as an element of counterinsurgency strat-
egy, which was honed during the Northern Ireland conflict through the Special Powers Act
of 1922, EPA of 1973 and PTA of 1974, has not only been exported to the rest of the United
Kingdom, but has been expanded in qualitative terms on the basis of the “emergency”
caused by the articulated threat of “terrorist” violence.
One case that highlights the pernicious drift of emergency into normalcy was the arrest
and questioning of Damien Green in November 2008 when he was the Conservative immi-
gration spokesman, and the search of his home and House of Commons office by the
Metropolitan police. While he was not subsequently charged with an offence or arrested
under counterterrorism legislation, the police used in the operation were Special Branch
counterterrorism officers, giving the impression that there was a terror-related aspect to
an investigation into leaks within the Home Office and the case was defined as being a
“national security” matter. In addition, covert recordings were carried out against Green by
the Metropolitan police during his arrest and questioning.
Following an investigation into the incident by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of
Constabulary, Denis O’Connor, it emerged that “a senior Cabinet Office official wrote
to the Metropolitan Police in October [2008] asking for police to examine the leaks in a
letter which stated that ‘considerable damage’ had already been done to national security”
(Liberty 2009). Following this report, Green also made the link between his treatment and
the impression given that this was a “national security” issue:
This report reveals that the excuse of “national security” used to arrest me was entirely bogus.
The police were misled about the security risks by a senior official in the Cabinet Office,
which is itself very disturbing. Then the police themselves used covert recordings to bug my
conversations with officers, which is only legal in terrorist arrests. The more we find out about
my arrest the more disgraceful it looks. (Liberty 2009)
This has not been an isolated case, as Sadiq Khan, MP, for Tooting in London, had conver-
sations with one of his constituents covertly recorded in prison by counterterrorist police
officers in 2005 and 2006. Following an inquiry into the circumstances of these events, the
then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, was able to declare that “the monitoring was carried
out lawfully under the legislation” (BBC News Channel 2008). The episode illustrated not
only that the law was sufficiently elastic to enable covert surveillance of an MP (apparently
without the knowledge of Jack Straw who was the Home Secretary at the time), but also
that the Wilson doctrine had been abandoned.6
The point here is not to debate the meaning of “free speech”, so much as to illustrate the
way in which emergency laws introduced in Britain to combat “terrorism” are impacting
on everyday life. The policy obsession with security driven “intelligence” has provided the
state with much wider powers of arrest, survelliance, detention and prosecution than ever
existed in Northern Ireland during the conflict from 1969 to 1998. Higher education itself
has been caught up in the security dragnet, with universities now being required to inform
the UK Home Office of persistent absenteeism within their student body in case this is
used as a cover for terrorist activities. The latest version of CONTEST, the UK’s strategic
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Higher Education and “terrorism” and adds that it is the responsibility of these institutions
of learning to prevent radicalisation of their students:
More than 30% of people convicted of Al Qa’ida associated terrorist offences in the UK
between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher education institution.
Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further education qualification. About 10%
of the sample were students at the time when they were charged or the incident took place . . .
Universities and colleges have a clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard
vulnerable young people from radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations. (Home
Office 2011, 67)
Conclusion: normalising the emergency
We are all now potentially in the frame of the counterinsurgency/terror strategy. The
lens of security now focuses within the centre rather than on the periphery. The need for
counterinsurgency strategies in the fight against international insurgencies and the threat
of domestic terrorism potentially implicates us all within the surveillance culture of the
twenty-first century, where only the colonial guilty or the suspect have anything to hide.
The National Union of Journalists held a demonstration outside the headquarters of the
Metropolitan Police in February 2009 due to fears that Section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism
Act enabled the police to stop and search press photographers in any situation and made
it an illegal offence to “elicit, publish or communicate information” relating to members
of the armed forces. In short, this potentially made it an offence to photograph a member
of the police or army which might be considered to be of use to someone planning an act
of terrorism. While the Home Office subsequently tried to defuse this protest by claiming
that taking pictures of the police would only be deemed an offence “in very exceptional
circumstances” (BBC News Channel 2008), the point was that this is now up to the police
and the state to determine.
Despite reassurances from the police and Home Office officials that new anti-terror
laws would not be used indiscriminately, this has not been the experience since their intro-
duction. Liberty highlighted, for example, that powers granted to the police under the
Terrorism Act of 2000 were widely used to manage peaceful demonstrations against the
war in Iraq at Fairford and Welford military bases in 2003:
Some of the state’s most draconian legislation was employed during the policing of demonstra-
tions at Fairford andWelford. This is a particularly concerning feature of policing at these sites.
Legislation designed to deal with a terrorist menace was being applied widely to a legitimate
civilian protest. Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 were routinely used at both locations,
even though no evidence was ever disclosed to show that a specific terrorist threat existed.
Armed police were deployed to patrol the area around the Fairford airbase and military per-
sonnel on duty inside the base were authorised to use lethal force in dealing with intruders.
(Liberty 2009, 14)
The CAJ provide a sobering warning from the Northern Ireland case that the use of the
law as a weapon in the counterinsurgency security arsenal can easily backfire and produce
what it was designed to avoid. In this scenario, the emergency becomes the norm, legal and
human rights standards slip and the rights of all citizens are eroded:
If the Northern Ireland experience is examined, it is obvious that – once introduced –
special/emergency legislation can all too easily become a permanent feature . . . The risk


































to them, and finds it convenient to keep operating outside the legal constraints of ‘normal’
procedures. (CAJ 2008, 15–16)
The good news in all of this, perhaps, is that more people may now sit up and see
counterinsurgency/terror policy for what it is. Not as a silent safety net provided by the
State to deliver national security, nor as a relatively benign “violence-lite” intervention
where omelettes are made without breaking eggs. Instead, the experience for many of us
within the metropole (the retention of DNA files, electronic surveillance including the
interception of e-mails and the possibility of detention without trial for 14 days, etc.) might
make us less sanguine about the capacity of counterinsurgency/terror policies to function
as a means of control once the Pavlovic levers of “terrorism” and “national security” are
pulled.
Perhaps inevitably, the London Olympics in 2012 was sucked into the security threat
vortex, as the UK Home Office’s CONTEST document published a year earlier identified
security threats as the biggest challenge to the event:
Terrorism poses the greatest security threat to the Games. Experience from previous Games
and elsewhere indicates that global sporting events provide an attractive and high-profile target
for terrorist groups, particularly given the potential for malicious activity to receive enormous
international publicity. London 2012 will take place in an unprecedentedly high threat envi-
ronment. Threat levels can change rapidly but by planning against a threat level of Severe we
have maximised our flexibility to respond to a range of threats. (Home Office 2011, 67)
Counterinsurgency/terrorism and the need to gather intelligence for worst-case scenario
planning makes us all potential insurgents in need of profiling, surveillance and suspicion.
The risk here is that the desire to secure produces a corrosive culture in the body politic
and across its public institutions.
This article has argued that counterinsurgency/terror policy should be regarded more
critically by its current academic and policy advocates, and in light of the failure of the
“war on terror” to deliver increased security, greater scrutiny should be applied to its
agencies, its techniques and its implications for states that make rhetorical claims to liberal-
democratic values. If this does not occur, the State and its coercive agencies risk being seen
as belligerents in political violence, not a buffer against it. As a consequence, the counter
will pose more of a long-term threat to the espoused values of its advocates, than the
insurgencies they are designed to defeat. This danger was recognised by Thornton who
claimed that while asymmetric warfare presented new challenges for counterinsurgency
agencies, nimble footwork was required to prevent such policies from undermining their
goals:
To maintain their strength, liberal democracies must act in accordance with the very principles
that make them liberal-democracies. Once certain boundaries are crossed, they become like
Rubicons; harsh measures come to be accepted as the norm, and harsh measures always have
their innocent victims – often, indeed. Actually creating those they seek to quell. (Thornton
2007, 179)
The cult of counterinsurgency holds out a number of mouth-watering prospects for poli-
cymakers, the police and senior military decision-makers charged with implementing such
strategies. These have helped counterinsurgency/terrorism activities to morph easily into
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and eradicating poppy production will make Afghanistan a more stable polity internally,
while externally reducing the black economy and endemic drugs problem in Britain. The
unique selling point used by such advocates is that these insurgencies can be de-escalated
and eventually quelled via methods which are, in essence, political rather than military.
Whilst not precluding the use of violence against the most recalcitrant of opponents, its
use is often downplayed by theorists who claim that winning the “battle for hearts and
minds” can be achieved by means other than physical coercion.
This was precisely the argument made by military and political leaders in Britain
during Operation Moshtarak in Afghanistan in February 2010 and uncritically repeated
by embedded reporters across the British and US media. The military offensive would
see most of the Taliban melt away, though the small number of hardliners would be
“engaged” militarily (i.e., killed). The space created by this would be filled by “wider-
peace-keeping” activities in such a way that the local population would be co-opted into
the re-construction effort (Egnell 2011, 311; Korski 2011). This is all to be achieved
over time, by winning the argument instead of (or as well as) winning the fight, and by
co-opting local populations and isolating the insurgents. The reality, however, as the his-
tory of counterinsurgency campaigns suggest from Northern Ireland through to Iraq and
Afghanistan, is that omelettes can rarely be made without breaking eggs and “dirty hands”
are the inevitable result.
Perhaps those who worry about the ability of counterinsurgency policies to prevail
through military, economic and political interventions are looking through the wrong end
of the telescope. The contention here is that much more could be achieved both at home
and abroad to win the battle of hearts and minds by UK policymakers by casting a more
critical eye upon the cult of counterinsurgency/terrorism, and by asking a more founda-
tional question. Would it not be more sensible to plough all of that blood and treasure into
policies that could prevent insurgencies in the first instance?
Notes
1. The ramifications of colonial counterinsurgency policies in Kenya are finally impacting on UK
domestic governance as a result of legal challenges from the victims. In October 2012, three
former members of the Mau Mau uprising against British military occupation in Kenya won
their UK legal battle to sue for damages over their alleged maltreatment/torture at the hands of
the British army, which reportedly included systematic beatings, sexual assaults and castration.
62 years after the events had taken place Justice McCombe declared in the High Court that there
was “ample evidence . . . that there may have been systematic torture of detainees” (Guardian
2012b).
2. This phrase was coined by former UK Home Secretary Reginald Maudling who boarded a plane
after his first visit to Northern Ireland and remarked: “For God’s sake bring me a large scotch.
What a bloody awful country”.
3. The IRA dropped the term “guerrilla” in favour of “volunteer” in its Green book from
1977 onwards (see Coogan 1993).
4. For detailed academic research on the issues surrounding “extraordinary renditions”, see The
Rendition Project at http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/.
5. For further information see “Northern Ireland Report of an Amnesty International Mission to
Northern Ireland” (28 November 1977–6 December 1977), Amnesty International 1978, avail-
able from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/docs/amnesty78.htm And for the Bennett Report,
see “Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern
Ireland”, HMSO March 1979. Available from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/bennett.htm.
6. This was the parliamentary convention brought in by Harold Wilson in the 1960s, which
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